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Abstract:
The NorSpaR project aims to analyse the main public policy initiatives by which Norway and Spain cope with the new social and economic challenges derived from the so-called New Social Risks (NSR). Although both countries present significant differences in their institutional settings (such as Spanish EU membership), or its belonging to diverse welfare regimes types (Norway is generally included in the Nordic regime, while Spain is part of the Mediterranean one), both countries share a common interest in addressing the aforementioned challenges while maintaining social cohesion. In the last decade, governments in both countries have tried to respond to those challenges by reforming their labour markets, adapting their unemployment schemes, as well as their gender, family and long-term care policies. The analysis covered in this project includes three areas of public policy addressing NSR. First, dependency is one of the most daunting challenges for post-industrial societies experiencing population ageing and with an increasing number of frail people in need of care. This situation is forcing governments to rethink their long-term care policies. Second, family and gender public programs need to respond to the growing difficulties of families in reconciling professional and family life. Third, in the transition to a post-industrial order, and in a context of mass unemployment, social protection systems have a renewed prominence. Along with the so-called passive policies offering financial support to the unemployed, active labour market policies are geared to put people back into work. In our analysis we try to find answers to the following questions: What are the challenges that each of these policies have been trying to address in recent years? How have these policies evolved? What kinds of reforms have been implemented, and which ones have been neglected? Have the policy goals and targets of welfare programs been modified in any significant way? Have the policy tools (services, transfers, funding or models of provision) changed? To what extent have these policies been successful in coping with social and economic problems? To what extent a social demand in favour of these changes exist? What are the main political and social actors intervening as stakeholders in these policies? Finally, what are the major similarities and differences existing between the two countries? To what extent are there policy proposals that might easily travel between them? Could they foster mutually enriching exchanges of information?

Keywords:
Welfare State; Public Sector Reform; Public Policies; Labour market; Long Term Care; Family Policies; Europe

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Family and Gender in the Spanish Welfare System

Marí-Klose, Pau

This paper is part of a Special GIGAPP Working Paper series aimed at disseminating the results of the NorSpaR Project (Coping with New Social Risk in Norway and Spain: Long-term policies, gender and family policies, and labour market and unemployment protection). This project has been financed by the EEA Grants through the Norwegian Embassy in Spain, and conducted by a group of Norwegian and Spanish researchers, including: Erling Barth, Inés Calzada, Svein Olav Daatland, Angie Gago, Arnlaug Leira, Pau Mari-Klose, Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, and Eloisa del Pino.

This document is an attempt to understand how family and gender policies have developed within the general process of consolidation of the Spanish welfare system. The study examines different factors that account for an "atypical trajectory of change": institutional predispositions, the timing of key political and social developments, the role of external pressures, societal changes, the activity of political actors and the enactment of broader policy reforms. The paper poses as research question the extent to which and the ways in which the Spanish welfare system has responded to new social risks, setting up new arrangements to meet emerging needs and demands related to care and the reconciliation of work and family life. The work that is presented here is the result of a systematic review of research conducted by Spanish scholars in the last two decades and my own work in the field, which includes both quantitative analyses of the main existing survey data about these issues as well as in-depth interviews with key actors in these policy domains.

1. The Mediterranean Familistic System

In a seminal article written in the mid 1990s, Maurizio Ferrera drew attention to the poor characterization of the Mediterranean Welfare States in the scholarly literature (Ferrera 1996). South European countries (and especially Spain, Portugal and Greece) remained out of the scope of observation in many of the main works on welfare published in the 1980s and 1990s (Flora 1986; Esping-Andersen 1990). The few scholars interested in the Latin rim usually focused on the "rudimentary" character of welfare programs, the strong influence of Catholicism and its social doctrine as well as the central role attributed to the family in the provision of welfare.

For a long time, the Mediterranean was identified as an area where family ties were particularly strong when compared to other regions in other parts of Europe. Such differences

have deep historical roots, which according to some accounts can be traced back to the Middle Ages.

Despite local variations, South Europeans have tended to follow distinctive practices during their life-cycle, such as late emancipation form parental home, frequent co-residence with parents after marriage, or spatial proximity between the homes of the elderly and their offspring. These practices have kept family loyalties strong and have sustained inter-generational micro-solidarities. A child receives support and protection until he or she leaves home for good, normally for marriage, even when providing such support involves the self-sacrifice of parents (especially of mothers, from whom material and sentimental care is generously expected). Grown-up children are also supported at different stages. They can rely on parents for financial support to engage in costly investments (e.g. purchasing a house or setting a business venture), or for assistance in childcare (Jurado Guerrero 2001; Iglesias de Ussel *et al*. 2010). Families in the Mediterranean European societies also protect their younger members from economic and employment downturns, absorbing part of the effect of high unemployment.

Somewhat in return, when parents face transition to old age, children are expected to help. It is usual to see grown-up children monitor the health of the parents and paying regular weekly or daily visits to them. When prolonging residential independence is no longer feasible for the elderly, living with their children is the solution that is taken for granted within the kin group and the broader community. In Spain it has always been said that the only truly poor person is one who has no family. The intergenerational solidarity is a strong social norm which seldom breaks down. It is shared by the society as a whole and learned at very young ages (Reher 1998).

The cultural and societal relevance of such practices and beliefs has no parallel in Central and Northern Europe, where family ties tend to be much weaker and the capacity of the family to function as a “shock absorber” is limited. The dividing line between strong and weak family systems is reinforced by the religious cleavage between the more “individualistic” Protestant ethics and the more “communalistic” Catholic and Orthodox ones (Greeley 1989). In South European societies, churches have exerted their influence on the structuring and functioning of social life, particularly as regards family matters. Both the doctrines of the Catholic and Orthodox churches have traditionally placed heavy emphasis in the importance of marriage, family ties and family responsibilities for the well-being of individuals and the cohesion of social order. The cultural hegemony and influence exercised by both Catholic and Orthodox Churches were mainly responsible for delays in law reforms undertaken in other countries several decades before, such as the recognition of civil marriage, the rights of out-of-wedlock children, divorce laws, or abortion. Religious traditions have also favoured particular gendered models of care provision, where women take on full responsibility for the domestic realm.

Until recently, the strong institutionalisation of marriage in the Mediterranean world accounted for lower divorce and cohabitation rates than those found elsewhere in Europe. In Italy the divorce law was not introduced until 1970, in Portugal until 1975 and in Spain until 1981. In all these countries, ‘no fault’ divorce was only implemented a few years ago. In this context, women who decided to get divorced (and their children) often faced stigmatization

and economic hardships, which discouraged many others to follow their path. This has had a big impact in the maintenance of the proportion of single parent households at very low levels. In such conditions, single parenthood was usually brought about by the death of one parent (and seldom by divorce or out-of-wedlock birth). When it occurred, extended family networks often intervened to assist "broken" families whenever needed.

Within households, the role of women has traditionally been pivotal. Women have often cared for children or older relatives at the expense of erratic careers, or full withdrawal from the labour market, especially after the birth of the first child. Even the few women participating in the formal labour market were expected to take on alone –or with the help of their mother or other female relatives– domestic and care-giving responsibilities. The male assumption of the 'breadwinner' rhetoric, together with the inclination of many women to maintain full control over the domestic domain, has discouraged males to get involved in domestic and care-giving activities. In these circumstances, working mothers have often been driven to hyperactivity. Such "superwomen" could only undertake demanding professional activities in the labour market if they were prepared to combine them with full unpaid caring work in households (Moreno 2004).

The existence of strong family support networks and the acceptance of care responsibilities by women has significant implications for the manners in which social risks and needs are dealt with and, hence, upon the structuring and functioning of Welfare States. The reference to the responsibilities of the family served to legitimise the provision of meagre social services, as well as to overtly justify political inaction in these areas of social policies (Saraceno 1994). The centrality of the family enables governments to rely on the family to meet the caring needs of their members and to guarantee their basic economic security, thus keeping political demand for public assistance rather low. Solidaristic expectations and resource pooling within the household also deactivated demands for the de-segmentation of labour markets, where women and young people have traditionally operated as "outsiders" occupying less desirable jobs than male breadwinners, either in the informal economy, or under short-term contractual arrangements (Andreotti *et al*. 2001, Karamessini, 2008).

As a result of all these practices, beliefs and institutional arrangements, South European welfare has traditionally been shaped in a differential manner from other regimes. Mediterranean countries have generally been characterised by relatively low levels of social expenditure, weak state support for families, and overall limited success in alleviating poverty and overcoming social and economic disparities

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, some authors noted that, despite rapid economic and demographic transformations, historical gaps between family systems largely persisted (Jurado and Naldini 1996, Naldini 2003, Gal 2010). The empirical evidence gathered in this paper cast some doubts upon such a claim in regards to the Spanish. Some of the distinctive features of the Mediterranean model are changing, prompted by the rapid transformations of the family (at the level of institutions, beliefs and practices) that traditionally upheld the model of welfare arrangements. Crucial for this development is the emergence of new lifestyles and risks embodied in younger cohorts, and policy innovations to deal with them. The combination of new risks and policy responses adopted across countries --and also within them-- has

increased the inner variability in the Mediterranean welfare regime. Spain is probably the country in Southern Europe where the transformation of family institutions, arrangements and practises has gone farther (Moreno and Marí-Klose, 2013).

2. The origins of family policy in Spain

The origins of family policy, understood as a set of social protection measures in favour of families, has to be traced back to the establishment of the General Franco's dictatorship in the late thirties and early forties. As indicated by Gerardo Meil (2006), Franco's regime presented itself as the solution to a 'family crisis' provoked by the reforms in family laws undertaken during the Second Republic (1931-1939).

The underlying assumption of the policies enacted by Franco was that the State had the responsibility to ensure income maintenance of families with children by taking on part of the burden of raising them. One of the basic ideological foundations of the Francoist regime was the "recognition, exaltation, and protection of the family as society's original cell" (Giron de Velasco 1951: 8, quoted in Meil 2006: 361). Inspiring and sustaining such views, one may easily see the general framework of the Catholic Church's social doctrine and, in particular, the deep concern with the growing influence of liberal understandings about family life espoused in the Republic legislation[1].

In particular, the Catholic Church showed big preoccupation for the increase in mother's paid work, which in the eyes of the Catholic hierarchies, undermined the family's functionality, pushing women's to abandon the care of their children and of their spouses. By doing so women's behaviour was eroding the social cement on the basis of which (Christian) societies should be erected. The figure of the mother and wife devoted to the traditional Catholic family was used as a central element in the rhetoric and policies of the regime. Mothers were invited to "return to home", where they could best serve the interest of their families and the State (Aguado 2011: 802). Hence, the Fundamental Law Code (*Fuero de los Españoles*) defined home as "women's sanctuary" and the Labour Law Code (Fuero del Trabajo) restricted access of women to paid work: "The State shall prohibit night working hours, regulate homework and liberate women from labour in workshops and factories" (Tavera 2006, quoted in Aguado 2011: 804).[2]

Within a context criticism of liberalism by the Catholic Church's, the commodification of work was seen as a threat for family life, especially when salaries imposed by market dynamics were unable to provide sufficient material resources to sustain family needs, and women were

[1] Several decades ahead of reforms in family law in many western European countries, the Second Republic established obligatory civil marriage, the equality of spouses, the possibility of divorce by mutual consent, the equality of children born within wedlock and those born outside, or the regulation of legal abortion (Meil 2006: 361). The Francoist regime abolished all these measures and criminalized behaviours and practises that contradicted the Catholic spirit and doctrine. The Penal Law of 1944 softened the severity of punishment of uroxicide (muder of one's own wife) in cases where the husband's "honour" was at stake (for instance, when he could bring up true charges of adultery against his wife) (Roige 2011: 731).

[2] Low income and working class women continued to work, but in the shadow economy, at home or in domestic service, deprived from basic labour guarantees and any kind of social protection. This has had important implications later on in their lives. Due to these labour trajectories, still nowadays many older women are unable to meet the conditions that entitle them to a contributory pension

forced to take jobs to supplement their husband's wage. The best way out of this entrapment was, according to certain Catholic sectors (supported by different encyclicals and by policy developments in France, Belgium and Italy), to set up a "family salary". Hence, unlike other countries with a strong pro-natalist orientation, the main initial motivation for family policy was compensatory. At a time when classic social insurance schemes had hardly developed, family policy became the main instrument at preventing the corrosive effects of poverty on family life, and in particular, women's incorporation to the labour force. The demographic pro-natalist motivation, which has often been considered one of the driving forces behind such policy orientations, played in Spain a secondary role in the initial phase of policy design and implementation, although it certainly end up acquiring great rhetorical dominance, and even provided the impetus for the creation of specific benefits destined to reward large families.

The idea of the "family salary" was embodied in the so-called Family Subsidies (1938). This initiative gave allowances for dependent children (up to age 14) from the second children, and included, starting in 1941, short-term widow's and orphan's pensions for families without resources. During these postwar years, new measures were introduced to encourage marriage in a context of housing and food scarcity, as well as to provide protection for large families. Loans were awarded to couples with low incomes, which could be repaid by having children. Large families were granted preferential treatment in transport, housing and employment, and prizes were established for the families with the greatest number of children (Roigé 2011).

The policy orientations were later reinforced in subsequent measures. Thus, in 1945, the labour Ministry introduces a second income transfer, the "Family Bonus" (*Plus de cargas familiars*). This family fund redistributed resources among workers in each company by taxing a certain percentage of the volume of total wages paid.[3] Each worker received according to his "family obligations" as well as the family obligations of the company's total workforce. Family obligations were ranked through a legally established scale which gave greater value to larger families (Meil 1995).

The family allowances distributed through Subsidies and the Plus represented a large part of the resources transferred through Social Security mechanisms during the 1940s and 1950s, when pension and health programs still remained at a very rudimentary stage. Gerardo Meil (2006) has estimated that the volume of resources handled through these schemes amounted to between 2.5 and 3 percent of the GDP. This situated Spain among the countries devoting more resources to family needs in relative terms, far beyond the resources dedicated to the classic programs of the Welfare State. However, the impact of these measures on household's disposable income was quite varied and regressive.[4]

During the second half of the authoritarian period, the regime undertook an in-depth reform of the Social Security system with the aim of establishing a more coherent system. This reform

[3] The percentages varied between 5 percent and 20 percent in different productive sectors (Toharia 1943, quoted in Meil 2006: 365)

[4] The degree of coverage was limited and heterogeneous. Allowances were destined to salaried workers (who could obtain up to 70 percent of their base salary through these allowances), leaving out self-employed workers and great many farmers in a country with a very large farming population. Among the salaried workers, many also were excluded from the Family Bonus (Meil 2006).

involved the cancelation of the Family Bonus and the reform of the family subsidies. With this reform, social protection through pensions gained importance thanks to the introduction of new entitlements to widows, orphans and economically dependent relatives (del Peso, 1967). Family allowances were strictly restricted to the conjugal (nuclear) family, leaving the other members of the kinship network outside of coverage. Social Security resources for family support decreased from values close to 3 percent of the GDP in the early 1969s to around 1 percent thorough the 1970s. Despite an expansion in coverage, in a context of accelerated economic growth and high inflation, benefits were not brought to date with inflation, and the allowances rapidly lost their value, with only one exception in 1971 (Meil and Iglesias 2001).

Despite the major political transformations brought by the transition to democracy in 1978, the system based on Social Security transfers was largely kept in place until 1991. During this interlude, benefits were not updated and the program was not re-evaluated to adapt it to the new family realities that were rapidly conforming as a result of the modernization and democratization of the country.[5] Successive democratic governments placed other social problems at the forefront of their political agenda, downplaying the importance of family economic support as a means of social protection. The political reluctance to provide economic support to families could also be seen in the income treatment of family.

Unlike what occurred in the post-war years, the combined effect of benefits and tax deductions end up having limited impact on families' disposable income. Over time, the consideration of family responsibilities as a qualifier for access to public support through specific family allowances and tax benefits disappeared, and these policies lost relevance within the social protection system.[6] After 1991, benefits for families with dependent children were extended to families outside the Social Security system, but became means-tested. The amount of the allowance was set at around 2 percent of the average wage, but it was again not adapted on a yearly basis to the increases in inflation until year 2000 (Meil 2006: 373). In 1991, Spain spend 0,1 percent of its GDP in direct allowances to families, well below 0,5 percent dedicated to these policies in 1980, and far from what leading countries in Europe were devoting to this policy (2,8 percent in Belgium and Denmark, and 2,6 percent in France).

Other forms of support for families received even less attention during dictatorship. Given its strong exaltation of mother's responsibilities and duties, childcare policies never entered the political agenda of the Francoist regime. We have to wait until 1970 to find the first legislative activity in the field. The Law of General Education of that year included children under six as members of the educational system, even when participation in "pre-school" services at those ages was declared non-mandatory. In fact, the large majority of children were raised at home, educated and socialized by their mothers or other female relatives. Celia Valiente (1996) has

[5] The approval of Constitutional law in 1978 brought about legal changes with significant implications for family arrangements and dynamics. The Constitution shaped a new marriage model based in the equality of spouses' rights and obligations. The traditional legal subordination of women to their husband or fathers was eliminated. The new divorce law in 1981 consecrated the right of spouses to break up their relationship after a period of legal separation

[6] However, to be fair, it must be said that the family situation became a criterion for defining the degree of protection of other policies, such as unemployment benefits and the means-tested social salaries established in the Autonomous Communities.

estimated that in 1975 (which represents the last year of the dictatorship) around 25 percent of children aged four to five were enrolled in pre-school, most of them (64 percent) in private preschool centres.

However, unlike other family-friendly policies, pre-school for 4-5 year old children expanded rapidly in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, two out of every three children were enrolled in a preschool centre at those ages, thanks to a large increase in the public supply. Children enrolled in public centres in 1992-93 reached 64 percent.

This expansion of pre-schooling among children aged 4 and 5 is the result of the political lobbying of policy entrepreneurs in the education domain. Political decision-makers adhered to arguments which saw in the provision of pre-school services an opportunity to foster equity, by facilitating children from lower-income background access to the kind of pedagogical experiences to which only children from well-off families used to be exposed. Hence, the emphasis was entirely put in offering children from disadvantaged family backgrounds educational opportunities that could benefit them later rather than on providing families with services that could help reconcile work and family life and facilitate thus the participation of women in the labour market (Valiente 1996).

The ideas behind the expansion of educational services for children aged 4 and 5 represented paradoxically a restriction for the expansion of childcare for children at earlier ages. The same advocates for pre-school tended to consider children at earlier ages unsuited for the type of educational experiences that benefited children when they were 4 and 5 years old, and placed all the intellectual and political pressure on expanding public services for the latter group. Enrolment in childcare for children under 3 was rather infrequent up to the mid 2000s, and generally, in private centres.[7]

In addition to this, it is necessary to stress the lack of interest that feminists of all sorts showed in these issues. From the beginning of democracy, feminist thought in Spain, and particularly among women with decision making responsibilities within the public administration (the so-called *femocrats*) neglected the potential role of childcare services for the improvement of female condition. Other issues and demands were given much higher priority. After several decades of rule of an authoritarian and patriarchal regime, the list of claims and unmet demands was long, and helping mothers reconcile work with family responsibilities was not an issue to which much attention was paid. On the one side, Spanish feminists were mainly exposed to intellectual traditions that played down the experience of motherhood and caring responsibilities towards children. On the other, Spanish feminists were very reluctant to address issues in a field (the family domain) which the Francoist regime had considered for so long the cell of Spanish society. The source of feminist hesitation about family policies was the rejection of the Francoist exaltation of the family in general and motherhood in particular. Many of the Spanish feminists that took on public responsibilities in the first democratic

[7] Data about schooling rates among children aged 0-3 are scarce before the 2000s. According to official data (MEC 1995) and estimations of Valiente (1996: 109), 0,8 per cent of children 0-1 were enrolled in childcare in academic year 1992-93, 2,8 percent of one year olds, and 8,7 percent per cent of two year olds. In academic year 2000-2001, rates reached 2, 9 and 21 per cent respectively (Leon 2011: 324). Schooling rates varied enormously between regions.

governments had been actively involved in opposition movements against the authoritarian regime, where criticism against official discourses often turned into the overt rejection of the family as a potentially democratic institution (Valiente 1996).

As a result, feminist policy entrepreneurs were rarely concerned with the development of childcare services that could help working mothers fulfil their labour and domestic commitments. Their focus of attention lied in other pending issues. From the very beginning, their main goals and lobbying activity were clearly concentrated on achieving the legal equality of men and women in the many domains where this was not guaranteed yet (such as protection against discrimination and harassment in the labour market), fighting for the development of a divorce law and the recognition of reproductive rights (such as abortion and full access to contraceptives), or combating gender violence.

3. The sudden and ongoing transformation of the Spanish family regime

Family institutions change slowly, but when they do they are likely to prompt broader societal transformations with implications for other domains –cultural, economic, political. As we have see above, for a long time, Spanish families have maintained characteristic features that set them apart from those in central and northern Europe. However, probably beginning in the second half of the 1990s, the family institution and social attitudes toward family arrangements and practices started to change at an unusual and quite unexpected speed. Crucial for this development is the emergence of new lifestyles and risks embodied in younger cohorts. Young people have developed new mindsets that are guiding their orientations decisions about family formation and breakup and caring responsibilities in new directions. New types of households (such as single parent, same sex marriage and unwed couples), which were illegal or stigmatised only a few decades ago, have become more and more common among members of younger cohorts.

Marriage rates have declined to levels unseen in other European countries (except for Portugal) and practices such as divorce have proliferated lately.[8] Although cohabiting couples are still significantly fewer when compared with other EU countries, living together prior to marriage is becoming the marker for entry into first union for young couples. Closely related to this development, there has been a significant increase in non marital childbearing. Births out of wedlock rates have converged with Central and North European countries (Moreno and Marí-Klose 2013).

A complementary manner of visualizing the relevance of such changes is to examine the development of new values and attitudes regarding family formation, maintenance and dissolution. When asked how important family in their lives is, a large majority of Spaniards invariably consider family relationships very important. Most of them also hold favourable views of marriage. However, according to European Value Survey data, in Spain the proportion of people who think “marriage is an outdated institution” comes close to proportions found in

[8] As a result, divorce rates, which traditionally lagged behind those found in Central and Northern European countries, stand today above average.

Central European countries. Young people are more likely to express negative views of marriage: 41.5 percent of Spaniards under 35 think marriage is an outdated institution, in contrast to 14.5 percent of people aged 65 or older.

Table 1. Marriage is an outdated institution (percentage that agrees)

	1990	2008		
	Total	Total	18-34	65 and over
Greece		20.9	27.5	10.6
Italy	13.5	18.7	21.7	12.7
Spain	15.1	32.4	41.5	14.5
Portugal	23.2	30.8	33.5	14.3
Belgium	22.5	33.9	32.8	29.9
Germany	30	29.2	40.4	11.9
France	29.1	35.2	27.4	35.4
Austria		30.2	39.4	19.3
Netherlands	21.2	27.5	26.7	23
UK	17.6	23.1	27.3	16.1
Ireland	9.9	22.6	23.5	16.5
USA	8			
Australia		17.5		
Sweden	14.1	20.7	24.2	14.8
Finland	12.5	14.9	22	3.5
Denmark	18	13.4	16.8	8.1
Norway	10.1	19.4	22.8	16

Source: EVS 2008.

Attitudes toward cohabitation, the conditions for a happy relationship and divorces have also changed significantly. Most Spaniards justify divorce or find cohabitation as perfectly "normal". Especially, young cohorts in Spain have developed attitudes that are more similar to those found in Central and Northern European countries than those in other Mediterranean countries (especially, Italy and Greece) (Moreno and Marí-Klose 2013: 500-501).

A second dimension related to family life that deserve which has undergone dramatic changes is childrearing. In the last two decades, Spain has scored historic lows in fertily rates. The decline in fertility rates reflects constraints for families who intend to have children, such as uncertain job prospects or difficulties in combining work and family life. But beyond such considerations, having children is no longer seen as a duty or as a cultural imperative to be fulfilled in Southern Europe. The percentage of older Spaniards (65 years and older) who agree with the statement "It is duty toward society to have children " is 2.3 times higher than among young people (18 to 34 years old) Similarly, the percentage of people agreeing with the statement "women need children in order to be fulfilled" varies across age groups (it is 1.95 times higher among older Spaniards than among young ones). Young Spanish families have entered a new scenario, where having children has become more a decision to be taken by the partners involved, than being the result of compelling social norms and cultural expectations. Attitudes among Spaniards seem to be changing at a faster pace than in other Mediterranean countries, bringing them in line with attitudes found in Central and Northern Europe.

Table 2. Attitudes toward childrearing

	It is a duty to have children		Women need children to be fulfilled	
	18-34	65 and over	18-34	65 and over
Greece	32,2	69,3	71,7	89
Italy	14,7	38,5	50,5	68,5
Spain	23,6	55	35,4	61,9
Portugal	36,3	57,1	42,4	76,2
Belgium	9,5	31,6	25,8	42,3
Germany	22,9	73,2	41,5	65,2
France	10	43,4	52,6	76
Austria	21,9	34,3	32,8	45,9
Netherlands	1,7	8,3	4,4	12,4
UK	13,4	10,5	15,3	22,5
Ireland	19,5	28,6	15,5	29,4
Sweden	6	6,1	6,8	7,6
Finland	9,7	14,3	6	
Denmark	12	22	72,3	84,6
Norway	13,7	16,2	17,3	14,3

Source: EVS 2008

Changes in the behaviour and orientation of young Spaniards cannot be properly understood without giving close attention to transformations in young women's lives and expectations. The last decades in Spain have witnessed the rapid erosion of the distinctive features of a "male breadwinner model", even when it is so far difficult to see the endpoint of such a transition.

Table 3. Female employment rates at different ages

	25-29	35-39	55-59
Greece	63	65,4	33
Italy	55,1	63	33,8
Spain	72	66,7	38,1
Portugal	72,3	79,4	52,5
Belgium	75	74,1	38,8
France	72,8	76,6	52,4
Germany	68,9	74,3	58,9
Austria	73,9	79,9	42,6
Netherlands	82,1	78,7	54,7
UK	72,9	73,6	63,9
Ireland	78,7	67,4	47,2
Sweden	75,8	84,4	77,7
Finland	73,6	79	70,1
Denmark	79,4	84	73,8
Norway	79,1	84,5	73,9

Source: OECS Employment Database

The main driving force behind such transformation has been, no doubt, the increase in female participation in the labour market. The increase in female employment rates in Spain has been larger than in any other Mediterranean country. A close look at labour participation patterns across the life cycle reveals that female employment rates are similar to those found in Continental Europe and Britain and Ireland for those under 30 years (pre-maternal years for most of them). Such rates are somewhat lower for women on their thirties and early forties (in parallel with child rearing commitments), and they are notably lower in older ages.

Dual-earner families have proliferated among young couples. The availability of two sources of income has become a requirement *sine qua non* for the couple to stand on their own two feet. Dual-earner families have proved to be the best strategy to purchase housing and a good deterrent against poverty in the early stages of the family cycle (Pavolini and Ranci 2008, Iglesias de Ussel *et al*. 2010). A singular feature of many of these new families is that both partners work full time (part-time job opportunities are scarce), posing thus severe difficulties for balancing work and care responsibilities in these families (Moreno 2006). Hence, arrangements based in full-time work of both partners is significantly more common (around 60 percent), than in northern European countries, where part-time work is common in couples with children (especially among women).

Table 4. Strong support for the dual-earner model

	1990	2008
Greece		38
Italy	23,8	28,1
Spain	28,4	43,9
Portugal	32,6	34,6
Belgium	28,6	45,6
Germany	12,9	38,4
France	37,5	58,3
Austria	30,3	34,2
Netherlands	8,1	8,7
UK	16,3	68,4
Ireland	14,9	30,8
Sweden	60,5	44,9
Finland	28,4	23,4
Denmark	29,8	33,7
Norway		65,6

* Percentage who agree strongly with the statement:
Husband and wife should contribute both to household income.
Source: WVS 1990, EVS 2008

Support for the dual earner model is well established in Spain. More than 90 percent of Spaniards either “agree” or “strongly agree” with such a statement “both partners should contribute to household income”. Commitment to the dual earner model is stronger today than twenty years ago: the percentage of people that strongly agree with the statement used in the European Value Survey has increased substantially when comparing responses in the

2008 wave with those given in the 1990 survey. Younger people stand again above the average.

The "flip side" of these orientations are attitudes towards housewifery. About half of Spanish women find housewifery as fulfilling as having a paid job. The percentages are not much different from those in other European countries (with the exception of Britain and Ireland or Finland, where the role is very well regarded). Women in younger cohorts attach lower value to housewifery. The gap in attitudes between young and old women is around thirty points in Spain, much larger than in most of the countries.

Table 5. Attitudes toward the role of the housewife

	1990	2008		
		Total	18-34	65 and over
Greece		55.6	49.3	62.6
Italy	51.8	51.9	38.4	68.2
Spain	58.2	47.9	40.2	70.5
Portugal	45.2	46.6	44.6	53.3
Belgium	63.9	64.7	62.3	73.6
Germany		37.8	31.9	44.4
France	57.3	52	50.2	57.3
Austria	63.4	58	50.9	70.9
Netherlands	57.2	57.2	55.6	65.9
UK		68.5	67.8	78.8
Ireland	70.8	73.1	69.1	86.3
Sweden	62.5	46.6	37.5	57.4
Finland	55.4	78.4	72.6	85.9
Denmark	53.7	46.1	40.2	49.8
Norway	59	45.3	46.8	58.7

* Percentage who agree with the statement:
Being a housewife is as fullfilling as having a paid job.
Source: EVS 1990 and 2008.

Unlike their mothers, a large amount of women in the younger cohorts have attained high education credentials, which feed professional aspirations that are incompatible with taking on the lion's share of domestic and caring responsibilities. Even those who have low education levels have increased their priorities towards a professional career. These labour-oriented women are reluctant to accept "superwomen" roles, in which they strive to manage "impossible situations" (Nicole-Drancourt 1989), where they are the main providers of household services for the family while they simultaneously carry on with their professional activities. As a result, care practices have changed substantially.

4. Formal and informal care in response to societal and normative changes

The rapid transition of the Spanish society to a new scenario where women have significantly reduced their commitment to unpaid tasks in the household, poses challenges for the

provision of services and care within the family. A first question is to what extent young mothers have been able to transfer domestic housework and caring responsibilities and to whom.

The first hypothesis often discussed in the Spanish literature is that much of caring responsibilities have been transferred to grandparents —generally women, or 'granny-mothers'— and older relatives, reinforcing thus the cultural bases of the model of "family and kin solidarity". Evidence is far from conclusive, due to limited data available. According to data of the European Social Survey 2004, the hypothesis that parents and grandparents are providing services to their grown up children and grandchildren (living in a different household) to a much larger extent than their counterparts in Central and North European countries is somewhat inconsistent.

Table 6. Provision of housework and care support for grown up children and grandchildren

	None	Some support	A lot
Greece	59,8	29,9	9,4
Italy			
Spain	72,7	23	3,7
Portugal	56,3	37,8	5,4
Belgium	57,7	33,4	7,5
France	63,5	30	6,4
Germany	58,2	31,4	7,9
Austria	46,3	41,5	9,6
Netherlands	76,3	19,3	3,1
UK	70,3	21	6,7
Ireland	67,4	25	7,1
Sweden	64	30	4,4
Finland	62,5	32,5	2,5
Denmark	67,7	26,1	3
Norway	63,6	29,6	4,4

* people aged 40 and over with grown up children or grandchildren.
Souce: ESS 2004.

Even although such perceptions may be coloured by normative orientations which make provision of housework and care support more palatable to Spanish older granmothers than for their counterparts in Central and Northern Europe, this strategy has its limits. Older *mater familias* available to take on caring roles are decreasing, as they are more prone to stay within the labour market and, thus, have less manoeuvrability to carry out demanding unpaid tasks for their daughters. Moreover, a growing number of young people choose (or are forced) to live far apart from their parents and in laws, which makes attempts to maintain this kind of networks of informal support increasingly difficult.

A second source of help for young women increasingly committed to their labour careers might have come from their male partners. The evidence that young men are contributing to meet the needs left unfulfilled by the decline of housewives' work is also mixed. Table 7

reproduces data on the portion of time that women say their partners spend carrying out housework. Figures indicate the percentage of male partners who perform more than 25 percent of the total time devoted to such activities within the couple (drawn from the European Social Survey, Round 2). In other words, the table shows the proportion of male partners who cooperate significantly in domestic chores, although many of them may spend between ¼ and half of the time (and therefore still do less than their female partners)

Table 7. New masculinities in Europe, by age groups

	1. Men who cooperate wirth their female partners *		2. Attitudes towards male responsibility for home and children**		
	18-44	45 and over	18-34	35-64	65 and over
Greece	9,5	4,9	29,4	31,2	31,1
Italy			36,3	34,8	31,4
Spain	29,9	14,9	60,7	58,9	39,9
Portugal	17	8,8	30,8	25,6	25
Belgium	32,2	32	50,2	52,4	46
Germany	26,6	31,6	70,3	63,1	62,8
France	33,2	24,8	49,9	44,5	42,9
Austria	22,7	29,9	42,5	38	65,6
Netherlands	29,7	29,8	18,2	25,2	21,7
UK	27,8	33,7	39,3	27,2	23,2
Ireland	20	17,8	43,7	37,6	36,4
Sweden	61,1	45	69,9	59,5	58,1
Finland	51,9	51,9	53	49,4	47,2
Denmark	47,2	47,5	62,2	63,8	58,9
Norway	43,5	43,9	80	79,7	77

* Men who take on more than 1/4 of the total housework time (female responses)

** Strong agreement with the statement: Men should take the same responsibility for home and children

Source: ESS 2004 (1) and EVS 2008 (2)

According to figures in Table 7, young Spanish males tend to be more "cooperative" than their older counterparts. Close to one out of three young males in Spain cooperate with their female partners, at levels tantamount to those found in Central Europe. Aggregate data across Europe seem to confirm findings of other studies conducted at the individual level. The behaviour of men appear to be affected by the extent to which women are economically independent and hold non-traditional gender expectations (Davis and Greenstein 2004; Geist 2005). Countries where women have consolidated their "bargaining" capacity, as a result of their higher educational levels and better economic resources, tend to score higher in gender equality within the family sphere.

Individual factors do not necessarily account fully for the variance found across countries.[9] As broader normative environments, national contexts matter may contribute to shape the propensity of men to cooperate. Pressures for women to do and men to avoid housework are likely to be stronger when views supporting a strict division of housework are widespread, as it

[9] For instance, variation between male cooperation in Portugal, where the level of female labour participation is higher but the proportion of cooperative men is significantly lower.

may be the cases of Greece, Italy and Portugal. In contrast, it may be expected that men will feel more compelled to devote more time and effort to housework in response to widely held attitudes legitimising such behaviours. According to Table X, normative orientations are found in Spain to a much larger extent than in other Southern European countries, especially among younger cohorts. Similar strong support for male involvement reaches levels only found in France and some Nordic countries. Not surprisingly, the gap between younger and older generations in Spain is the largest.

However, there are reasons to believe that, although important, the increased male cooperation does only partially cover the investments in time and efforts required to meet domestic and caring needs. There is growing evidence showing that a great deal of "care deficit" in South European households is being met by new strategies of *commodification* of care work. Thus, recent studies have gathered evidence indicating that some forms of care --- especially of older and sick dependants-- is moving from the traditional realm of unpaid family support to a grey area of poorly paid work. Much of this work is performed by female immigrant workers (Moreno-Fuentes and Bruquetas 2011). These new arrangements may not contradict previous orientations and expectations, since informal work of immigrants is most often still monitored (and often directly paid) by family members. Care is generally considered as a female gendered area within the household, where the employer (usually a women) establishes a personal relationship with the employee and sets the terms under which caring tasks are performed (Lutz 2007).

Table 8 . Enrolment in formal care for the under 3s and pre-school from 3 to 5 years, 2008

	Under 3 years	3 to 5
Greece	15,7	46,6
Italy	29,2	97,4
Spain	37,5	98,5
Portugal	47,4	79,2
Belgium	48,4	99,4
France	42	99,4
Germany	17,8	92,7
Austria	12,1	77,6
Netherlands	55,9	67,1
UK	40,8	92,7
Ireland	30,8	56,4
Sweden	46,7	91,1
Finland	28,6	74,2
Denmark	65,7	91,5
Norway	51,3	94,5

Source: OECD family database.

There is also much evidence that childcare responsibilities have increasingly been externalised to formal services, relieving grandparents and other relatives from the need to provide broad support. At this point in time, enrolment rates of children aged 3 to 5 years in pre-school is

nearly universal. Enrolment rates for children under 3 years have increased dramatically in the last decade. According to OECD data, in Spain the proportion of children of 0-3 years in childcare centres (both public and private) has increased from 5 percent in 2000 to 37.5 percent in 2008 (OECD 2001, OECD Family database 2011). Recent survey data (February 2010) show that the figures are even higher: 43.6 percent (Marí-Klose *et al*. 2010).

A growing number of Spanish women have lost the reluctance to enrol their children in formal childcare. Social pressures requiring them to devote themselves full time to the care of young children has weakened. In sharp contrast with attitudes dominant in the past[10], most Spaniards no longer think that holding a job for a mother with children under three is detrimental for the latter.

Table 9. Attitudes to mother's work when she has a pre-school child

	1990	1999	2008
Greece	78,2		72,5
Italy	77,8	81,4	75,8
Spain	66,2	45,8	47,7
Portugal	84,2	72,2	65,5
Belgium	60,8		37,4
France	65,4	56,2	38,6
Germany	84,3	73,2	50,2
Austria	82,9		64,6
Netherlands	63,2	45,7	39
UK	54,6	46,2	36,3
Ireland	52,8		33,8
Sweden	73,5	37,8	19,4
Finland	52,4		21,8
Denmark	32	18	8,6
Norway	45,6		19,4

*percentage of people agreeing with the statement:Pre-school child suffers with working mother
Source: EVS 2008.

5. Policy action and innovation in a new family regime

As shown above, for close to two decades, democratic political activity deliberately chose inaction in the field. The introduction of family-friendly policies was extremely difficult given strong institutional path dependencies and a lack of interest of political actors in getting involved in a policy area that had been a marker of public efforts to build a non-liberal society during the dictatorship. The first two decades of the democratic regime can fairly be considered “lost time” for the modernization and progress in the area. However, beginning in

[10] It is possible to track down many sociological studies which, over the 80s and 90s, documented through qualitative and survey research the high prevalence of *maternalistic* orientations. Within this mindset, the idea that children under certain ages had to be cared for by their mothers was just indisputable. Fathers could help raise children at these ages, but not replace the key role of the mother without endangering their well-being and appropriate psychological development (Alberdi et al. 1994, De Miguel 1994, De Pablo Masa 1976, Iglesias de Ussel, 1984)

the mid 90s, it became increasingly obvious that the newly acquired prominence of new lifestyles, social risks and emerging needs would make the development of family-friendly policy mechanisms a line of action that the two parties that opted for government could no longer ignore.

A first push factor was the progressive *Europeanization* of social policy in Spain (Guillén and Álvarez 2004). During the 1990s, new scholarly understandings of the challenges faced by the "European social model", as well as ideas and policy solutions to modernise public provision, informed EU directives and recommendations. From there, they poured down into the national political debates, shaping the reflection on the shortcomings of the national Welfare States, and re-orienting political attention towards new risks and needs. In this sense, European guidelines have had a strong influence on policy shifts that involved gender and family issues following EU Directives regulating maternity protection (1992) and parental leave (1996) (Treib and Falkner 2004). The strong commitment traditionally shown by Spain to follow European guidelines (as the expression of the 'late comer' member to 'catch up' to the median EU figures and indicators) facilitated the transfer of these policy orientations.

In this sense, the arrival of the conservative Partido Popular to political power in 1996 marked the beginning of a new phase in which family policy acquired a renewed prominence. The Law of Conciliation of Work and Family Life (1999) and the so-called Integral Plan for the Support of Families (2001) became the two first initiatives with some measurable impact undertaken in two decades of democratic experience in this policy area. Both laws opened the door for several political initiatives. Among the most relevant, we find a new understanding of parental leave, which gives working men the possibility of taking up 10 out of the 16 weeks of parental leave granted to working women after giving birth. The new impetus of the conservative government in support of family-friendly policies can also be seen in the introduction of tax deductions of 100 euros per months for working mothers with children under 3.[11]

The new visibility of gender and family in the political agenda of the conservative party was accompanied shortly afterward by an unprecedented attention to family policies by the main opposition party, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). As aforementioned, during four terms in office (1982-1996), the socialist party could only show a meagre record in the family domain. However, the arrival of president Zapatero inaugurates no doubt the most prolific period for gender and family policies in Spanish recent history.

From the mid 2000s onwards, Zapatero's government introduced wide range of measures to favour the bearers of new social risks associated with sociodemographic transformations affecting families, including initiatives to favour the residential autonomy of young people, to promote female employment and the conciliation of work and family life (through an expansion of childcare and elderly care) encourage fertility and help young families through birth grants (Salido and Moreno, 2009; Ferrera, 2010, Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013). Parental leaves schemes were revised and expanded. Hence, fathers of newborns were given a

[11] Both measures were widely criticized for targeting only women already in the formal labour market and, in the case of the monthly tax deduction of 100 euros, for adding very strict eligibility criteria. The tax deduction for working mothers was also seen as highly regressive. It allocated the same amount of resources to all working mothers, irrespective of their household income or personal wages (Salido and Moreno 2009).

15 days leave (with the promise, which never came true, of increasing the leave period to four weeks in 2013) and eligibility criteria for working mothers were relaxed so that a larger number of women could benefit. Between 2004-2010 social protection expenditure on family/children functions increased well above the European average (36 percent over the six year period, only below the Irish growth within EU-15) (Eurostat Database 2013).

In a climate of economic optimism such measures represented a significant departure from traditional welfare arrangements in Southern Europe.[12] In contrast to the goals stated by the conservative government in their policies (aimed at strengthening the capacity of families to fulfil their roles and responsibilities), the initiatives of the socialist government in the family domain were embedded in a wider agenda that aimed at advancing gender equality through regulation of labour relations (in order both to prevent discrimination and favour the internal promotion of women in their jobs), a national strategy to fight against domestic violence, and educational campaigns to promote new gender values.

However, expansion along these lines did not last long enough to ensure institutional resilience. Reforms came to a sudden halt in 2008 with the eruption of the financial and economic crisis. In the face of mounting budgetary pressures, both the socialist first and the conservative government from 2011 onwards opted to put their efforts at saving the institutional core of welfare provision, subjecting the newly created policies targeting new social risks to major cutbacks. Zapatero first, and the conservative government of Mariano Rajoy later, concentrated many of their first budget cuts on policies targeting new social risks. In 2010, Zapatero eliminated the birth grant, which guaranteed 2.500 euros to families of newborns and newly adopted children, and curtailed assistance to young people moving out of parental home. Following the electoral defeat of the socialists in late 2011, the new conservative government led by Mariano Rajoy significantly reduced the resources devoted to long term care and to childcare policies, seriously compromising the financial sustainability of these programs. From 2009 to 2011, expenditures devoted to the Family/Children function decreased from 1,52 percent of the GDP to 1,38 percent after years of continuous growth (Eurostat)

Beyond Europeization and the new political impetus behind the expansion of new family-friendly policies, we can clearly see an additional push factor of policy action and innovation in the decentralization of social spending. Decentralization of substantial responsibilities regarding welfare provision, coupled with new arrangement for fiscal autonomy, provided the impetus for the expansion of new welfare policies. Regional initiatives pushed welfare growth beyond the limits traditionally established at the central level, sparking “demonstration effects” and learning processes in neighbouring regions. Particularly, areas of social services in Spain and Italy expanded significantly following decentralization, resulting in increasing inter-regional divergence in social rights and entitlements (which often was minimized later through practices of emulation) (Moreno 2011). These processes have raised concerns over the fiscal sustainability of such “races to the top”, as each regional administration aims at showing its

[12] Hence, Gösta Esping Andersen (2010: 4) has refered to the social-democratization of family policy in Spain. In the same vein, in a paper with a provocative title, Luis Moreno (2008) refers to “the Nordic path of Spain’s Mediterranean welfare”.

capability of providing top-class services in order to emulate other regions within the country which do so.

In this context, family-friendly policies have become a domain in which many Autonomous Communities have placed heavy emphasis. Thorough the years, many of them introduced several forms of preferential treatment for certain types of families (in transport, election of schools, access to housing benefits, etc), income transfers targeting specific households and families (family allowances, birth and adoption grants, tax deductions) and devoted resources to expand the social services offered at the regional level (Cantó et al. 2012). One of the areas in which regional diversity is most obvious is childcare enrolment, and in particular, the role of public and private facilities, which is much higher in some Autonomous Communities than in others.

Since the conservative government took office, Autonomous Communities (which devote a large part of their budget to cover the costs of welfare services) have seen funds coming from the central government severely curtailed, in what one may see as a "starving the beast" strategy of depriving regional governments of revenue in a deliberate effort to force them to reduce spending. Most regional governments responded introducing severe cuts in family-friendly policies.

6. Conclusion

The trajectory of the Spanish welfare system in regards to the family and gender domain is rather unique. In many respects, family policies represented for a while the core of a severely underdeveloped Welfare State, the policies of which were clearly oriented to protect and preserve a patriarchal male breadwinner model. As the core programs of the Welfare state in regards income-maintenance and social services expanded, family policies became marginal, only to gain some prominence during the 2000s. However, these latter developments did not last long enough to ensure institutional resilience. Existing gender and family policies seem unable to address persisting problems and some new pressing needs associated with the deep socio-demographic transformations that Spain has undergone recently. Among them, some seem very obvious just from a cross-national perspective.

1) There is a persisting problem with equality in the labour market. Women's participation rates in the labour market and wages (for the same jobs) are lower than men's, even among the most educated. Between 10 and 15% % of women withdraw the labour market after giving birth, and many of those who do not, experience wage penalties and other disadvantages associated with their condition. This suggests that it might be necessary to deepen social policy commitments to ensure full equality of opportunity between men and women. It has often been highlighted that, in order to make progress in this direction, men and women should enjoy the same entitlements concerning the care of children (starting with giving both of them the same type of parental leave rights) and should be expected to get equally involved in such activities. The latter probably requires cultural changes that are necessarily slow, but have to be actively strived for by the public sector.

2) A second pending issue is flexible and more rational working times. Spanish workers spend too much time at their jobs. In addition, work schedules make conciliation of labour and family life very challenging. The proportion of Spanish firms that allow some sort of flexible working commitments is low from a comparative perspective. The successive laws passed by the conservative and socialist parties have had limited impact in changing habits and behaviours of economic actors in this regard.

3) A major problem of Spanish society is the persistence of high child poverty rates, which stand among the highest in Europe. Some types of families with children, such as single parent households, are especially vulnerable. Poverty rates of children are related to characteristics of the labour market and the social protection system. Among the latter, it is remarkable the low capacity of existing programs of economic support for families to reduce poverty. Spain is one of the few countries in Europe that lacks universal allowances for families with children under 3. The generosity of existing allowances, subsidies and tax benefits is very low.

4) The percentage of children aged 0-2 enrolled in formal childcare has increased remarkably, and at this point stands at quite high levels when compared with other European countries. However, the expansion of childcare facilities around the country has not been accompanied by a similar shift in the orientation among some families with regards to childcare. There is a significant gap in the enrolment rates of children of high and middle income families (who are taking advantage of the public commitment to such policies) and low-income families, even after controlling for other intervening factors (such as mother's participation in the labour market). Low-income families seem reluctant to use such services, either out of normative reasons and expectations (the belief that care at these ages should be provided by mothers) or because of financial and institutional barriers (such as high fees and co-payments) prevent these families from gaining full access.

The future of gender and family policies is uncertain in a context of austerity. It is rather unlikely that the problems and needs that we have highlighted will be successfully addressed in the short run. No-cost regulation policies seem a poor strategy to attain further progress.

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El Grupo de Investigación en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas (GIGAPP) es una iniciativa académica impulsada por un equipo de investigadores y profesores del Programa de Gobierno y Administración Pública (GAP) del Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset (IUIOG), Fundación Ortega – Marañón, cuyo principal propósito es contribuir al debate y la generación de nuevos conceptos, enfoques y marcos de análisis en las áreas de gobierno, gestión y políticas públicas, fomentando la creación de espacio de intercambio y colaboración permanente, y facilitando la construcción de redes y proyectos conjuntos sobre la base de actividades de docencia, investigación, asistencia técnica y extensión.

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1. Gobierno, instituciones y comportamiento político
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