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Diaspora-led development through the corporate social responsibility initiatives of talented migrants

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Diaspora-led development through the corporate social responsibility initiatives of talented migrants

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Resumen/Abstract:

In this paper we explore the idea that talented migrants can assist in the development and growth of their economies of origin through brain-circulation dynamics, linking the developed world where they live and developing homelands they (or their ancestors in the case of later-generation diasporans) left behind. Depending on the roles these talented people play in the organizational (and institutional) environment at both ends of the migratory trail, different alternatives of diaspora-led initiatives are available to them. When these roles are attached to the private sector, the introduction of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives piggybacking preexisting diaspora tools (such as talent networks, open migration chains, diaspora-oriented institutions, etc.) might be the more appropriate and efficient channels.

Palabras clave/Keywords:
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, TALENT MIGRATION, BRAIN CIRCULATION, DIASPORA-LED DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

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Diaspora-led development through the corporate social responsibility initiatives of talented migrants

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Paper presented at the III Congreso Internacional en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas "Más allá de la crisis: Nuevos desafíos, nuevas capacidades", September 27 to 28, 2012 in Madrid, Spain.

Introduction and context[1]

Methodologically, this paper leans toward an appreciative theory approach[2] and while due to the limits on its extension and scope it does not offer an empirical component of its own, it allows for the reassessment of existing case studies under the light of our main argument.

As its title suggests, our main argument proposes that talented migrants can assist in the development and growth of their economies of origin through different initiatives, depending on the role these talented migrants play in the organizational (and institutional) environment of both their home- and host-lands. When these roles are attached to the private sector, the introduction of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives to piggyback on preexisting diaspora-led development tools might be an appropriate mechanism for articulation.

To explore this argument, we analyze it in the light of four premises, devoting a section of this paper to elucidate each of them:

1. That being innovation one of the main factors behind sustained economic growth, the quest for knowledge can lead to the migration of talent towards developed economies, particularly towards the world's innovation poles.

[1] This paper follows closely on the theoretical background section of Gutiérrez-Chávez, J. E. (forthcoming): Brain Circulation & Institutional Reform: Diasporas as Archimedean Levers in Mexico, Russia and Argentina, Doctoral Thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

[2] "Appreciative theorizing tends to be close to empirical work and provides both guidance and interpretation. Mostly it is expressed verbally [or narratively, a opposed to mathematically] and is the analyst's articulation of what he or she thinks really is going on. However, appreciative theory is very much an abstract body of reasoning. Certain variables and relationships are treated as important, and others are ignored. There generally is explicit causal argument. On the other hand, appreciative theorizing tends to stay quite close to the empirical substance." (Nelson, 1994:3)

2. That while talent migration has both negative and positive consequences for the origin economies, fostering the (re)engagement of diasporas and their homelands can enhance the brain-circulation dynamics and mitigate -drain effects.

3. That once brain-circulation dynamics are established, different types of diaspora-led development initiatives can occur, depending on the characteristics of the diasporas and the organizational settings and roles of talented diasporans.

4. That when those roles are within the non-government sector (in both non- and for-profits), Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives may be introduced to piggyback on preexisting diaspora-led development tools.

As this paper participates in the panel "Social responsibility under crisis contexts: an institutional look from a comparative perspective", our concluding remarks will not only share some insights and challenges derived from our research, but also offer some general thoughts on to the panel's topic.

Premise #1: The quest for knowledge and innovation can lead to the migration of talent

According to the endogenous growth economic theorists, economic growth depends on the creation of value, and the creation of value depends, on the one hand, on the accumulation and use of production factors subject to diminishing returns, and on the other hand, on the creation and use of new knowledge and technology as an endogenous factor to push the production frontiers further.

> *The physical world is characterized by diminishing returns. Diminishing returns are the result of the scarcity of physical objects. One of the most important differences between objects and ideas… is that ideas are not scarce and the process of discovery in the realm of ideas does not suffer from diminishing returns. (Romer quoted in Cortright, 2001:4)*

So, on the one hand, knowledge and ideas are a special kind of asset that is neither entirely public, nor entirely private, and this duality is at the heart of knowledge's increasing returns (Nelson & Romer, 1996). On the other hand, ideas and knowledge still suffer from other issues affecting traditional assets, like being subject to obsolescence without perennial investment in research, development and innovation (Aghion & Howitt, 1998).

Moreover, knowledge consists of both explicit and tacit components, and as Iskander, Lowe, and Riordan remind us, the tacit component of knowledge cannot be fully codified for its dissemination as it is tightly linked to the social interactions and everyday practices in which it is embedded:

> *Although they are often presented as opposites, tacit and explicit knowledge are deeply interconnected: indeed, as Polanyi pointed out, it is the tacit,*

> *embodied, dimension of knowledge that allows us to fully interpret and understand explicit knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Hidreth and Kimble 2002). […] But tacit knowledge too depends on explicit knowledge to be functional: explicit articulations act as symbols of tacit knowledge. (Iskander, Lowe, & Riordan, 2009:6)*

This process is what Lundvall and Johnson (1994) call learning by interacting, which is just one of the many facets of learning as a multidimensional issue, with important geographic implications. The deep connections and the human and social interactions required to learn, create, embody, use and disseminate knowledge further motivate an increased spatial concentration of knowledge-intensive or knowledge-based economic activities into clusters or learning regions where the synergies provided by their geographical agglomeration can be achieved (UNCTAD, 2008).

Logically, this spatial concentration is extremely important in the attraction of talented migrants, as it was evident since as early as the 1970s in parallel with the increasing awareness on human capital, when Lee (1970:441) suggested that the relationship between education and migration was indeed a necessary one. More recently, studies on the highly-skilled segment of migration still build upon the progress around the theories of human capital (Iredale, 2001).

After all, as Guilmoto and Sandron propose, "human capital is, with financial capital, the type of investment that 'travels the least bad': a migrant endowed of a certain qualification may also expect to extract value from it in a different country" (2003:20)[3], and much like financial capital, the international mobility of human capital may also be analyzed in terms of stocks and flows (D'Costa, 2008).

Since "well educated and/or talented people are often more internationally mobile than unskilled workers" (Solimano, 2008:21), when highly-skilled individuals cannot maximize the potential value of their human capital on their domestic labor market—due to market failures in the allocation of talent; international wage differentials; or as the "relative depravation" theory would have it, differences in working conditions and career advancement opportunities; adverse political conditions, etc.—they might consider finding chances for better self-development abroad.

Some neoclassical economic models would suggest that, as people migrate, equalizing market dynamics take place—meaning that the reduction in the supply of highly-skilled workers and the consequent reduced competition for job opportunities demanding qualified personnel will eventually increase the wages of the source country's labor markets with a mirror effect in the destination country—and "remittances together with the return of skilled migrants to the source region [and other spillovers] will stimulate economic growth, eventually eliminating spatial inequality and the wage differential that drives migration"(Goss & Lindquist, 1995:320; Solimano, 2008) arriving to a new equilibrium.

[3] Freely translated from the French original: "le capital humain est, avec le capital financier, la forme d'investissement qui «voyage le moins mal»: un migrant doté d'une certaine qualification peut ainsi espérer la mettre en valeur dans un autre pays."

However, as Ellerman reminds us, this theory holds only under the assumption of diminishing returns, characterized by negative feedback or self-limiting mechanisms. This assumption might not hold if "[i]ncreasing returns lead to multiple equilibriums, perhaps of a high and low variety (the twin peaks dynamics of divergence)" (2006:44), as is the case when facing self-reinforcing mechanisms and positive feedback induced by agglomeration and disagglomeration economies.

Figure 1: Critical Mass Dynamics of Emigration



Source: (Ellerman, 2006:26)

To better illustrate these dynamics (see Figure 1), Ellerman uses the example of restaurants and nightclubs: "a group of people leaving the waiting line at restaurant A to go to less crowded restaurant B may help equalize conditions between the two establishments, but a group of people leaving one nightclub to go to another may induce even more migrations in the same direction."(2006:27)

> *Above the critical mass C, the "more the merrier" dynamics of agglomeration set in to drive toward the high-level equilibrium at B. Below the critical mass, the dynamics of disagglomeration work to ghettoize the scientific community, until the low-level equilibrium is reached at A. Starting at B, if a few key people are cherrypicked or poached by the developed countries, the system may be pushed down below the critical mass at C, which would trigger the self-reinforcing downward spiral to A. (2006:25)*

Figure 2: Going North, Migrants as percentage of the population



Source: (Keeley, 2009:113)

The logic behind these flows is also consistent with Robert Lucas's (1988; 1990; Mankiw et al., 1995) observation that the movement of capital—human capital being no exception—usually follows a pattern from places where it is scarce to where it is abundant, and is supported by the fact that over 9 percent of the population in developed countries was born abroad while this is less than 2 percent for less developed countries (Figure 2), and data on international migration flows during the 1990s (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Economic migration in the 1990s (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2006)



Source: Le Monde Diplomatique

Premise #2: The migration of talent can lead to brain-circulation dynamics

While early studies of brain drain concluded that "skilled migration lowered welfare for the population remaining behind in the sending country" (Commander et al., 2004:264), recent studies might offer a silver lining to the dark cloud, suggesting that "with new opportunities in sending countries, [brain drain dynamics] do not necessarily capture the more 'circular' movements of professionals between sending and receiving countries" (D'Costa, 2008:47) as can be seen in Figure 4, especially in the upper right quadrant.

Figure 4: The Effects of the International Mobility of Technical Talent



Source: (D'Costa, 2008:65)

These positive effects of brain drain are a welcome contribution to developing—and to some developed—nations, given what it seems to be a recent consensus around its unavoidability. This unavoidability comes as countries actively and openly compete to attract talent via their immigration policies[4], due to the increased dependence on skills for the knowledge-based economy, the aging of populations throughout the developed world, and the lack of international integration of labor markets to cope with sudden domestic shortages of certain required skills (Kapur & McHale, 2005).

[4] This international competition is not limited to some fields of knowledge, and as Andrés Solimano (2008) suggests, talents may be categorized depending whether they are devoted to productive, academic or socio-cultural activities into: technical, scientists and academics, professionals in the health sector, entrepreneurs and managers, professionals in international organizations, and cultural talents, to which we might add sport talents.

It is this struggle between the mainly-negative- and the mainly-positive-effects views that characterizes the literature debate on the subject. The camp leaning towards a negative view holds that brain drain still causes the countries of origin to lose the positive externalities of skilled workers documented by Özden and Schiff as "(1) spillover productivity of other workers, (ii) public service provision (e.g. education and health), (iii) tax revenues, and (iv) public debate and policy institution influence" (Wescott & Brinkerhoff, 2006:4). This list is supplemented by Kapur and McHale (2005) with the loss of specialized skills—a growing development concern under the endogenous growth paradigm—and sector-specific effects that weaken indigenous research focusing on local problems.

Nevertheless, the camp leaning towards a positive view argues that the countries of origin may gain some positive effects unavailable without migration

> *[...as it] motivates others in the sending country to acquire more education raising human capital and possibly promoting growth [...so] emigrants may, in due course, return or, through networks and resource repatriation (such as through remittances) [...] promote a more effective flow of knowledge and information [...which] may be limiting the extent to which skills are actually lost. (Commander et al., 2004:236)*

Since the mental image of a brain drain evokes negative connotations, the existence of a "beneficial brain drain" causes interesting semantic conflicts which have generated a transformation in the vocabulary of the field that is succinctly summarized by Clay Wescott and Jennifer Brinkerhoff as ranging:

> *from the traditional "brain drain" (e.g., Özden and Schiff, 2005) to the increasing use of "brain gain" (e.g., Meyer and Brown, 1999a; Hunger, 2002; Margolis et al., 2004) and subtle variations on these, including "brain strain" (e.g., Lowell et al., 2004), ["brain bank" (e.g., Agrawal, Kapur and McHale, 2008),] "brain waste" (e.g., Özden and Schiff, 2005), and "brain exchange" and "brain circulation" (Gamlen, 2005; Vertovec, 2002; Saxenian, 2002; Pellegrino, 2001). The latter two are often linked to discussions of globalization and its impact. (2006:4)*

From these conceptual views of the phenomenon, brain circulation provides a better fit for the contextual references we analyze in this paper. This concept relies on a globalized environment much as the our contemporary one; on the models of endogenous economic growth, and proximities reviewed in the previous section; on an integrative approach to migration which blends macro-level structuralist social constrains and micro-level efforts by individual migrants and their networks related to human capital flows; and takes into consideration the tradeoff between the positive and negative effects of the international migration of talented labor (Saxenian, 2002; Saxenian & Sabel 2008).

Regarding the net result of this tradeoff between simultaneous positive and negative effects, different regions experience different outcomes: while most African and Caribbean experiences usually report a worsening skill gap from brain drain, several Asian and some Latin

American experiences have turned out to be success stories in capitalizing the gains of migration (Wescott & Brinkerhoff, 2006).

Rubin Patterson claims that for pure brain drain to occur, talented migrants moving from developing to developed countries should be "permanently uprooted from the homeland, without future involvement in its affairs"(2006:1891). However, that seldom is the case as migrants tend to group formally or informally into social, economic, or cultural transnational communities to reaffirm their identities and consolidate ethnic or kinship ties.

Moreover, there is an increasing consensus amongst experts that, given our globalized context, the fact that these migrants change their residence from their homelands to host countries does not necessarily imply an uprooting or an abandonment of the ties that link them to their countries of origin (Bakewell, 2009; Gold, 2005; Patterson, 2006; Shain & Barth 2003).

> *Distant proximities are real-life experiences that both integrate and fragment relationships outside and inside borders. Immigrant laborers are key protagonists of distant proximities; they integrate their home and host countries into the global economy as they seek to keep their families together. The end result is a transnational lifestyle, characterized both by opportunities and hardships that feature this paradox of distance and closeness. (Orozco 2008:208)*

Gabriel Sheffer calls these communities modern diasporas and defines them as "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands"(1986:3). Similarly, building on work by William Safran, Patterson refers to these transnational communities as "a people disperse from their original homeland, a people possessing a collective memory and myth about a sentimental and/or material links to that homeland, which fosters a sense of sympathy and solidarity with co-ethnic diasporans and with putative brethren in the ancestral homeland"(2006:1896).

Furthermore, Patterson suggests that, at times, these kinship and identity ties are so strong amongst those members of these transnational communities that "a member who has never lived in the homeland can have an even greater sense of obligation to support the homeland as another member who was born there"(2006:1896), and asserts from a world systems perspective that "transnationalism is an efficient means of transferring knowledge, skills and wealth from core nations to those in the semiperiphery and the periphery"(2006:1892); transfers which "reflect individual and group exercises of migrant's transnational identity through symbolic and material commitments to the homeland" (Orozco, 2008:209).[5]

[5] Not unlike the processes by which corporate strategies that aim to build worker identification with the company to reduce exit: "Identification becomes an important means for removing or reducing those inefficiencies that are labeled by the terms moral hazard and opportunism," writes Simon (1991, p. 41). This is one of the keystones of human resource policies in Japanese firms and firms using Japanese-style policies (Kagono and Kobayashi 1994). As each firm develops its own routines and procedures in a path-dependent manner, an increasing proportion of worker training may be firm specific, so that retention becomes self-reinforcing over time." (Ellerman, 2006:40)

It is also worth observing that while diasporas can operate as a cohesive actor, they are organizations, and as such, they are subject to internal dynamics among its own members, who can be classified in different ways. Following Bakewell, while membership of a diaspora is indeed a question of identity, it "should not be assumed on the basis of migration history, ethnic or racial background; it should be established by research." (2009:794)

> *Many authors appear to use the term diaspora as a synonym for migrants or the descendants of migrants (so called second and third generation migrants). [...However, t]here will be members of a diaspora who are not migrants, having been born in their country of residence. Likewise some migrants may not choose to identify with any diaspora and therefore, should not be considered as part of one. [...] These distinctions become particularly important when one considers the role of the migrants and diasporas in development. Much of the policy discussion is focused on how states can exploit the active engagement of migrants and their descendants in development. [...] As a result, maintaining, or re-establishing, contact with the diaspora and encouraging its members to live up to these expectations – 'courting the diaspora' (de Haas 2006) – has become an important policy concern [...]. An inclusive definition broadens the pool of people to whom they can appeal. (2009:793)*

Alasdair Rutherford (2009) takes the identification of diaspora membership one step further, in a typology that, whilst still identity-based, expands the possible membership of diasporas by access to count both an overseas and a domestic group with three different subcategories each. Moreover, he underscores the fact that placing diasporans in either of these six groups is never black and white as these circulate between types at different stages of their lives, or even exit altogether if the identity connections to the analyzed country are severed, as graphically presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Movements Between Diaspora Groups



Source: Adapted from Rutherford (2009:7)

On the one hand, the overseas groups include the lived diaspora—composed by "individuals who have spent some part of their life" in the analyzed country regardless of their origin—, the ancestral diaspora—composed by those "who can trace their heritage" to the analyzed country—, and the affinity diaspora—composed by individuals who have a bond to the analyzed country "without drawing a direct family link" (2009:3-4).

On the other hand, the domestic groups include the reverse diaspora—composed by people who have migrated "on a permanent or medium-term basis" to the analyzed country and who will become lived diasporans if they leave in the future—, the returning diaspora—composed by overseas diasporans who go back to the analyzed country—, and new diaspora—composed by residents who are planning to move overseas (2009:4-5).[6]

Once that the issue of membership has been relatively clarified, Shain and Barth (2003) categorize diasporans into three types: (1) core members—an elite of active organizers in a position to appeal the mobilization of other diasporans—, (2) passive members—those who are willing and able to mobilize when called upon by their leaders—, and (3) silent members—comprising a large pool of typically uninvolved diasporans, but who may react in times of crisis. Furthermore—and coinciding with the findings of researchers from Lee in the 1970s (see p.3) to Kuznetsov in recent years (see page 16)—Brinkerhoff suggests that

> *[t]he sophistication of individuals' participation is also likely to increase with progressive integration. The literature on voluntary associations finds that membership increases with education, income, and professional employment (Moya 2005). It should be anticipated, then, that as diaspora members*

[6] An example using Scotland as the analyzed country for the possible membership in each of these six categories, see Figure 6 on page 18.

> *progress educationally and economically in the adopted homeland they, too, may join more associations. More-educated diaspora members are also more likely to organize for homeland interventions that are national in scope (Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2005). (2008:159)*

Premise #3: brain-circulation dynamics can lead to diaspora-led development

An important premise of the brain circulation dynamics analyzed previously suggests that transnational communities can act as knowledge and information brokers (Gold, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003) or facilitating intermediaries (Brinkerhoff, 2008) to bridge what Ron Burt calls structural holes[7] between their homelands and hostlands.

Either passively—when diasporas are forced to react to external events imposed on them by their homelands or their host countries—or actively—as special interest groups (Shain & Barth, 2003)—"diasporans who engage in the building of institutions, conducting transactions and generally influencing local and national events in their respective homelands [...] have a huge comparative advantage over those [...] diasporans who fail to nurture transnational social fields with the homeland."(Patterson, 2006:1891)

The motivation to take an active stance is usually twofold and widely documented in the literature on migration. On the one hand, an interest to influence their homelands, acting upon a desire to contribute to the welfare of "their people" as seen from their host countries and shaped by feelings of identity, solidarity, kinship, maintenance of memory, as by security, financial, economic, or development considerations, among others.

On the other hand, an interest to influence their host countries, acting upon a desire to either improve their living conditions as members of a minority—as a collective or altruistic motivation—, or maintain and increase their organizations' influence in the political agenda—as an interest group or self-interested motivation (Gold, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003).

> *Diasporas, as other transnational actors, thus enjoy a privileged status of exerting influence as an interest group in both the homeland and the hostland, often affecting the homeland* because of *influence in the hostland [and vice-versa...] In any case, as interest groups, diasporas may use whatever clout they can to advance their interests. (2003:461)*

[7] "Through his study of corporate managers, Burt determined that individuals able to broker beneficial information and resources between distinct, otherwise disconnected networks were especially effective and successful at their jobs. 'People on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to be a broker of information between people, and control the projects that bring people together from opposite sides of the hole'(Burt, 2000, p. 4)." (Gold, 2005:19)

Yet, in order to do so, diasporas should first have the desire and achieve the capacity, or as Shain and Barth word it, "there should exist motive, opportunity, and means"(2003:462). These elements inextricably linked to the efficacy of diasporas depend, in turn, on a series of highly contingent interconnected factors: (1) the degree of motivation, (2) the nature of the hostland and (3) homeland—that is, on how the institutional arrangements allow or limit the interplay of interest groups on both sides of the divide, and more specifically on the social environment and attitudes towards the transnational community at both ends—, and (4) the strength of the engagement between the diaspora and the homeland—a factor that includes the level of cohesion within the diaspora.

Those factors will help determine the role of diasporas as development players[8] in three distinctive influence areas—business, knowledge, and culture (Rutherford, 2009)—and in three distinctive levels of influence, which according to Mohann (cited in Patterson, 2006:1897) and to Robinson (cited in Orozco, 2008:211), can be identified as:

a) Development *in* the diaspora: entails the use of networks in the host country in the "formation of ethnic businesses, cultural ties, and social mobilization"(2008:211). Sometimes, this type of activity is also supported by the homeland in order to improve the living conditions of their nationals abroad, and when possible, to capture spillovers from that development (2006).

b) Development *through* the diaspora: results from the "networking within and between diasporas of the same [...] group in different parts of the world"(2006:1898) as a way to harness these diffuse global connections and facilitate the groups' overall well being (2008).

c) Development *by* the diaspora: refers to the "flows of ideas, money, and political support to the migrant's home country" (2008:211); in other words, the diaspora works mainly "if not exclusively in helping the homeland develop."(2006:1899)

Figure 6 offers a matrix depicting an example using Scotland as the country of analysis for each of the six diaspora groups identified by Rutherford (see page 10) and the influence areas mentioned just earlier to help clarify who could be considered a member of these groups. Figure 7 "offers a matrix depicting migrant economic activities and their three dimensions"(2008:212) to help clarify the different dynamics and activities associated with each of them.

[8] "A development player aims to find solutions to human needs and to offer alternative ways to promote self-sustainability. In more practical terms, economic development is a conditions by which individuals and society at large enjoy a good quality of life, are free, have opportunities for upward mobility, and are able to improve their material circumstances." (Orozco, 2008:207)

Figure 6: Example for Scotland of Diaspora Subgroups by Link & Role

	Role		
Link	**Business**	**Knowledge**	**Cultural**
Lived	Individuals who have worked in Scotland, and now work overseas	Foreign students who have returned home; Scottish academics working overseas	Scots in the art, media or culture industries who now work overseas
Affinity	Business leaders who have an affinity for Scotland;	Knowledge professionals with an interest in Scotland, perhaps through their research	Artists, musicians or other creatives based overseas who draw on Scotland for their work
Returning	Diaspora returning to work in Scotland	Diaspora returning to study in Scotland; to work in academia in Scotland	Diaspora from the culture industries returning to work in Scotland
New	Scots leaving to work overseas;	Scots leaving to work in the knowledge sector in other countries	Scots in the art, media or culture industries intending to leave Scotland
Reverse	Skilled immigrants coming to work in Scotland	Foreign academics coming to work in Scotland; foreign students coming to study in Scotland;	Artists, musicians or other creatives immigrating to Scotland
Ancestral	Individuals of Scots descent who wish to invest in Scotland	Students and academics who want to study or work in Scottish knowledge sector because of their roots	People who claim a Scottish ancestry and want to see and experience Scotland for themselves

Source: (Rutherford, 2009:31)

Figure 7: Three Dimensions of Diasporas' Links to Development

Development Activities	**In the diaspora**	**Through the diaspora**	**By the diaspora**
Family remittances	Banking The unbanked	Financial intermediation; Micro-finance institutions	MTOs, e.g., Thamel.com
Consumption of goods and services	Supporting demand for products	Supply of home country commodities	Small business development
Investment of capital	Setting up minority owned business	Technical training in remittance receiving areas	Manufactured goods; nostalgic trade; tourism
Cash and in kind donations	Capacity building	Project identification; networking	Social philanthropy

Source: (Orozco, 2008:212)

However, there are also important challenges to the efficacy of diasporas as interest groups. Firstly, that proactive diasporas are still learning to integrate their initiatives and strategies to the formal development efforts of other more experienced development players. Manuel Orozco (2008) suggests this learning process has not been easy in practice, for six reasons: (1) development experts' disbelief about diasporas' role in development; (2) uninformed expectations and limited knowledge of diasporas' presence, work, and quality by some traditional development players; (3) lack of expertise and focus from some organized

diasporas; (4) academics' poor contributions to develop systematic approaches to link diasporas and development; (5) the political implications; and (6) the poor communication between diasporas and other players.

Secondly, that sometimes diasporas are passive actors which require other players to court them. In that sense, Rutherford (2009) identifies six challenges: (1) identifying diaspora members is complicated; (2) poor quality of communication; (3) diasporas are not always receptive to be engaged; (4) the extension of rights to diasporas for engagement to be sustainable might be politically complicated; (5) continuous engagement requires constant follow-up contacts; and (6) diaspora-oriented initiatives must be considered within a broader strategic framework in which there might be conflicting initiatives.

Thirdly, that the context in which diasporas work as interest groups is systemically pervaded by mistrust, and the complex identities of diasporas as both insiders and strangers becomes an issue to articulate adequate relations with the institutional establishment at both the host- and homeland:

> *Economically powerful ethnic minorities have traditionally been suspected of having greater loyalty to their ethnic community than to the host country and of being tempted to exploit the latter to benefit the former. [...However, w]hether diasporas are seen as adjuncts to rather than adversaries of domestic elites depends on how the two groups have interacted historically. (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006b:46)*

Moreover,

> *Few governments or nongovernmental organizations adopt [a participatory process] approach to diaspora mobilization: expatriate leaders are rarely invited to help design national development programs or support the formation of new strategic partnerships between the government and diaspora leaders. Instead, suboptimal forms of cooperation between home country governments and diasporas dominate. These include traditional, broad, and unfocused government pleas for support, usually for humanitarian relief; intensive political consultations between governments and traditional political leaders of the diasporas; and sporadic attempts by diasporas to rearrange themselves and establish new organizations with a stronger focus on home country developments that usually do not receive adequate support from the government. (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006:232)*

Finally, that when diaspora's influence and activism become strong enough to challenge the status quo of either the hostland or the homeland, there is potential for conflict to spark with the power elites who might perceive their privileges—usually derived from their dominant positions in closed polities and institutions, or crony capitalism—as threatened. Consequently, these elites may become entrenched (Kuznetsov, 2009) and may mobilize their power and resources to stifle or even outrightly block any diaspora-oriented or -led initiatives.

While it makes sense intuitively that every society attempts to assume the most efficient institutional arrangement to achieve the highest possible welfare level befitting its inherent

geographic, historic, cultural, and socioeconomic profile as rational-choice authors would suggest, in reality this seldom happens.

Daron Acemoglu suggests that this is due to the unrealistic application of Coase's theorem to political situations[9], and that an alternative hypothesis closer to empirical evidence is one based on what he calls "theories of social conflict", where certain "societies choose different policies, some of which are disastrous for their citizens, because those decisions are made by politicians or politically powerful social groups that are interested in maximizing their own payoffs, not aggregate output or social welfare."(2003:621)

Moe highlights that "what looks like an exercise in cooperation often hides the underlying exercise of power"(2006:56), for example:

> *[...]consider a stylized situation in which a criminal presents his victim with the classic choice: "your money or your life". An economist might say that this is just another case of voluntary exchange [...as it entails] acting on his preferences and making a rational choice. [... However, t]he criminal is using threats of violence, and he is coercing the victim [...so, t]he victim "voluntarily" gives up his wallet when faced with the power-constrained choice-set, because he is better off giving up his money than getting killed. (58)*

For Moe, political elites often control a specific agenda of alternatives much in the way the criminal of the example controls the choice-set: by revoking an original status quo and replacing it with the choice of either playing by the new rules or being penalized. After all, it is those rules that distribute and allocate power on different actors, placing some of them in positions of relative advantage in the decision-making process vis-à-vis other actors, and making the exercise of power conflicted, controversial, contested, and in need of legitimating mechanisms (Offe, 2006).

> *When the entrenched elites in a developing country see highly educated young people emigrating, does that steel their resolve to make the changes necessary to staunch the brain drain? Or does it reduce the pressure on them to give up the privileges that are barriers to development and that lead to the brain drain in the first place? (Ellerman, 2006:44)*

Fortunately, as Kuznetsov and Sabel remind us, "[s]ave infernal traps (interlocking political and economic equilibrium traps which block learning before it gets started), any developing economy [...] has segments or at least some high ranking officials which are forward looking, dynamic, and efficient. The same applies to the private sector [...] Old and new elites co-exist side by side"(2008:93). The challenge, thus, lies in locating these points of entry to articulate institutional changes.

[9] "Typically, contracts and explicit promises are enforced by the state. Hence, contracts that the state, or social groups controlling the state, wish to write with the rest of the society are non-enforceable. This implies that the allocation of political power creates an inherent commitment problem that undermines the potential to achieve efficient outcomes." (Acemoglu, 2003:648)

In the next section, we will discuss some of the frameworks related to the articulation of these institutional changes which, in turn, offer the tools through which Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives can piggyback to be implemented more successfully under William's notion (as cited by Ellerman, 2006:38) of "paving the paths".[10]

Premise 4: existing diaspora-led initiatives might be served by the piggybacking of csr initiatives

Yevgeny Kuznetsov (2009, 2011) has identified five categories for diaspora-led development initiatives—remittances, philanthropic contributions, investments, technological and organizational knowledge transfers, and opportunities for incremental institutional development—and has organized them into a pyramid framework (see Figure 8) that goes from a subsistence agenda at the base, towards a self-actualization agenda at the top, as a ranking based on both their frequency of occurrence and the relevance of their contribution toward the development of the countries of origin.

Figure 8: Hierarchy of DIASPORA Impacts



Source: (Kuznetsov, 2009:36)

In this regard, we acknowledge that, at the base of the pyramid, remittances and other donations and micro-transfers are extremely important sources of income for many nations,

[10] Ellerman (2006:38) suggests, it is time to rescue the "pave the paths" metaphor used by Williams in 1981, in which instead of paving paths of a campus at the time new constructions are built, one should leave the grass to see the footpaths that people actually follow and then pave those worn paths: instead of creating new ways or institutions for the use of members of the diaspora to help in the development of their homelands, policies and initiatives should aim at supporting the self-organized diaspora efforts.

funding poverty-reduction world-wide in total volumes that significantly outpace the investments in aid for development (Irving, Mohapatra, & Ratha, 2010)[11].

We also acknowledge that the role of diaspora in the attraction of foreign direct investment to their homelands is relevant when diasporans are in decision-making or decision-influencing positions of large companies. However, these initiatives should count towards the institutional change caused by diaspora, and not as part of the third echelon of the pyramid. As Richard Devane suggests that migrants themselves are not likely to be pioneer direct investors as "most investors prefer investments located within five hours of their home so they can easily supervise their progress" (2006:64).

That said, we will largely ignore the lower three echelons of the pyramid and focus on the upper two. This because we consider knowledge and innovation, as well as the potential for institutional change to be the key contributions that differentiate talented migrants from those with lesser levels of skill. Additionally, we also consider that those are the echelons to which the Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives should be directed if they want to better impact the development of these communities.

This non-linear quality of the impacts of talented migrants to their homeland development means that one person can have a big impact given the appropriate combination of factors. These people are usually overachievers—or in the words of Saxenian and Sabel (2008) "new Argonauts"—who become champions and pioneers devoted to the achievement of an ambitious, yet humble idea. Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Senior Economist at the World Bank Institute's Knowledge for Development Program, has developed an appreciative theory in which he describes a diaspora mobilization framework (Kuznetsov, 2009; 2011) that comes in handy for the analysis of that particular kind of diaspora contributions.

The process usually starts when overachievers make use of their established—or create new—social networking resources and their role in the organizational and institutional arrangements both at their home- and host-lands to search for strategic allies and partners to bring about the sought institutional changes.

When unsuccessful, these overachievers are able to draw valuable lessons from each experience, and are not easily discouraged, persisting and learning from each attempt. When successful, each completed initiative usually becomes the seed for a new initiative that goes gradually *in crescendo* in terms of both ambition and results.

Moreover, the overachievers' search networks in time become institutionalized and these talented diasporans may eventually become what Kuznetsov calls "Archimedean levers". So

[11] Even if these lately seem to be the subject of growing controversy on their potential to generate development: whereas on the one hand, they can be extremely useful tools for community-driven development if used as a part of a wider strategy, on the other hand, there are growing concerns that the short-term expenditure-oriented assistance derived from this type of contributions might demotivate public actors to generate much needed mid- and long-term capacity-building/strengthening poverty-reduction policies, thus effectively eroding this tool's development potential (Bakewell, 2009; Ellerman, 2006). "Remittances need to be understood exactly as what they are: foreign savings. As with any other source of foreign savings, like aid, trade, or investment, remittances interact with the structure of the local economy."(Orozco, 2008:213)

just like in the concept borrowed from physics, this metaphor implies people that through the—geographical and/or institutional—distance given by being part of the diaspora abroad, are able to generate enough influence and force to push certain changes that might have otherwise been either impossible—or, at best, extremely difficult—to implement.

Throughout the process, the organizational and institutional roles of the talented diasporan become very relevant resources for the success or failure of the overall initiative. In a juxtaposition of the individual drive by the overachievers and the level of organizational support they can accrue, Kuznetsov classifies initiatives into four distinct and very self-explanatory categories, represented in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Diagnostic Monitoring framework for diaspora initiatives



Source: (Kuznetsov, 2010:17)

Applying this framework to possible CSR initiatives, on the one hand, sometimes talented diasporans within non-governmental (both in non- and for-profit) organizational settings may have diaspora-led development ideas to attempt, acting as switchers—intermediary nodes and information brokers between strategically complementary networks (Castells, 2011), in this case— between their professional organizational networks and their diaspora networks. If unsuccessful in his attempt to gather enough organizational support, yet successful in the implementation of his initiative through other means, this “heroic success” will be an important one-of-a-kind project.

On the other hand, some CSR initiatives start at the organizational level with all the backing and support of the organization at their disposal, yet they fail to capture the interest of the talented diasporans to act as switchers. These projects are doomed to be there for the company to integrate their CSR portfolio, but will not have the desired impact in the target stakeholder community, becoming a “living dead” project.

This happens because while CSR initiatives often come with the appropriate funding and resources beyond the reach of most diasporan initiatives at an individual level, for not considering the target stakeholder communities within their planning, or for not knowing in depth their specific characteristics, these doomed initiatives may only reach suboptimal levels of efficiency at best, or even be complete failures in the worst case scenario.

While initiatives usually start in the "hit the wall" quadrant as serendipitous sparks, and move towards other quadrants of the diagnostic framework, only a very small fraction achieve the status in the upper right quadrant of what Kuznetsov and Sabel (2008) call "guided serendipity". For this reason it is of paramount importance to attempt the piggybacking of CSR initiatives on other diasporan tools at the disposal of talented migrants.

Diasporans acting as network switchers between the organization and their communities, are able to offer the "interpretive engagements" required to "reap the knowledge necessary to build these [initiatives]" (Iskander as cited by Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2008:93-4), "as bridges, mentors, and antennae" (Kuznetsov, 2006). In these roles, diasporans become reputation intermediaries to enhance trust between the company or NGO and the diasporan's networks to improve collaboration and efficiency in a win-win situation.

The piggybacking of CSR initiatives through diaspora networks may also be useful if seen from the perspective of what Kuzentsov and Sabel (2008) call iterated co-design[12]: by applying principles such as benchmarking and error detection and correction to trigger disciplined discussions of pragmatic cooperation "in response to both the need to formalize collaboration in volatile conditions and the impossibility of doing so completely." (2008:107)

Finally, when CSR initiatives are in the interest of the organization, and talented diasporans are unwilling or unavailable as switchers, or vice versa, when initiatives by individual diasporans are unable to gather enough organizational support from his or her immediate professional network, these actors in search of a partner may turn to the institutionalized resources that some countries and communities around the world have set up for these purposes.

Alan Gamlen (2006; 2008) from the Oxford University's Centre on Migration, Policy and Society has compiled a wide inventory of countries which have embarked in the task of generating these policies. His latest typology has two broad categories—diaspora building and diaspora integration—that contain five different types of policies aimed at cultivating a diaspora, recognizing the diaspora, extending rights related to citizenship, extending rights related to services, and extracting obligations from those citizens which may be seen in Figure 10.

Such an inventory might be useful to assess whether diaspora-oriented or –led CSR efforts will eventually come in contact with the governments at the homelands and whether institutionalized policies to support them exist or not.

[12] While the authors use the term in the context of industrial relations and industrial policy (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2008:106-8), the idea may equally be applied to the design of CSR initiatives with the relevant diaspora communities.

Figure 10: Diaspora Mechanisms in Selected States



Source: (Gamlen, 2008:845-6)

Additionally, Dovelyn Agunias's research (2009) deals with the specific subject of institutions created to engage with diaspora. Covering the objectives and activities of 45 different institutions in 30 developing countries[13], she groups them into three types: (1) homeland government institutions—at: (a) ministry level, (b) subministry level, (c) special offices including diaspora committees, and (d) local level—, (2) consular networks—providing (a) help

[13] Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Haiti, India, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Yemen.

in the hostland, and (b) links to the homeland—, and (3) quasi-government institutions—as: (a) foundations, and (b) advisory councils.

Agunias's study also offers interesting conclusions to CSR practitioners of what to expect from diaspora institutions, which are "in many ways no different than other institutions in developing countries" (2009:18). Moreover, Agunias draws four specific suggestions for country governments interested in improving their diaspora engagement activities, which might be equally interesting for CSR practitioners in their own engagement efforts:

1. Do the homework: meaning preparatory work—(1) "understanding diasporas' needs, wants, and potentials", (2) "apprising the current government approach", and (3) "learning from the experience of other countries"—to "ensure that institutions adopt policies based on skills, capacities and intentions that complement one another."(2009:18)

2. Value the process as much as the outcome: as it is crucial "how institutions were created and how activities were chosen"(2009:19) to generate trust and ownership with the diaspora, ensure legitimacy, operational transparency, and avoid political manipulation.

3. Invest in capacity building: through adequate funding with appropriate levels of expenditure and learning, through cost-sharing with the private sector and the organized civil society, through improving technical know-how to define and pursue goals efficiently, and through the creation of meaningful partnerships with the private sector both at home and where diasporas live.

4. Link institutions to national development priorities: as "governments face serious challenges in clearly identifying the professional, financial, and social capital of diasporas abroad, and in matching these forms of capital with concrete development strategies at home"(2009:24); however, sometimes the bigger challenge is political, as "treating migrants as development actors [...may be interpreted as if] the government cannot fulfill is obligation to promote development"(2009:25).

Both, Gamlen's and Agunia's inventories may come handy to CSR practitioners in search for a strategic partner in the implementation of their initiatives, and once a partnership is formed, Kuznetsov's appreciative theories and frameworks discussed earlier may become useful tools to track the initiatives' progress towards more efficient outcomes for all stakeholders involved, and thus, better opportunities for deeper development impacts.

Insights and challenges

From our research we can extract at least four important insights, each in itself a challenge for practitioners of both CSR and diaspora-led development, and one for each of the premises we established in our introduction.

The first is that all—but especially developing—economies need to have a better understanding of their absorptive capacity—"that is, their ability to recognize the value of new external information and to assimilate and apply it" (World Bank, 2010:167)—in order to increase their ability to acquire the adequate mix of skills and competences to succeed in the knowledge-based globalized context.

The second insight is that talented migrants may provide that understanding and the aforementioned increase. However, for those benefits not to be lost through the drain effects of migration, the establishment of brain-circulation dynamics is necessary. While there is no one-size-fits-all recipe to achieve this goal and sending countries must try to understand better how to achieve these dynamics, there is one *sine qua non* characteristic that must take place: the reengagement of innovative diasporas with their homelands.

The third insight is that diasporans and diasporas may not necessarily be migrant communities abroad. In fact, the establishment, construction and maintenance of diasporic identity is a complex and effort-consuming process that cannot be taken for granted for those who are willing to engage in diaspora-oriented initiatives for development. Nonetheless, once the specific groups and networks are identified, chances of success for those initiatives are much better.

The fourth insight is that corporate social responsibility initiatives and diaspora-led initiatives for development are very compatible elements. Whether the CSR efforts are intended as a corporate philanthropy, as risk management, or as value creation, the level of collaboration with either talented diasporans as network switchers or the institutionalized search networks provided by public efforts around the world will be directly proportional to the chances of success and the impact of the CSR efforts.

In conclusion, these four insights allow us to establish the validity of our main argument that talented migrants can assist in the development and growth of their economies of origin through different initiatives, depending on the role these talented migrants play in the organizational (and institutional) environment of both their home- and host-lands by introducing CSR initiatives to piggyback in preexisting diaspora-led development tools as appropriate and effective mechanism for institutional change articulation.

Also, as mentioned in our introduction, this paper participates in a panel "Social responsibility under crisis contexts: an institutional look from a comparative perspective". Therefore, we would like to close by offering some thoughts linking our research to the wider panel topic.

Just five years ago, the Secretary-General of the United Nations anticipated an age of mobility,

> *"when people will cross borders in ever greater numbers in pursuit of opportunity and a better life. They have the potential to chip away at the vast*

> *inequalities that characterise our time, and accelerate progress throughout the developing world". (Ban Ki-moon as quoted by Keeley, 2009:12)*[14]

However, the world economic downturn and its various local crises have had a profound effect, on the one hand, rising protectionist and anti-immigrant sentiments in many developed economies allowing politicians to adopt a more restrictive stand on immigration policies, and on the other hand, in the attitude of public and private decision makers towards what is deemed as expenditure in lower-priority issues.

While genuine economic, socio-demographic, cultural-identity, national-security, political, linguistic, and even religious concerns are at the heart of the immigration debate, unfortunately, several of such sentiments may also be misguided by fear. A similar logic affects the cuts of government funds contributing to local and international aid for development, and in the case of the cut of companies' investments in CSR initiatives where the return-on-investment horizon seems too distant to bear in the face of more pressing matters. For that reason, crisis times are the right time to reevaluate our paradigms and rethink the way in which these sensitive issues operate.

It is our opinion that the main intersection of both the debates about immigration and about social responsibility lies at the heart of the concept of citizenship. The pervasiveness of economic thought on political science for the past century has pushed certain philosophical and sociological considerations out of the limelight. At both ends of the political spectrum, people are seen as clients, consumers, workers, employers, or target markets, and seldom seen as citizens in the deeper sense of the word.

It is sad and worrying that notwithstanding globalization, cosmopolitanism is still a somewhat obscure idea, and if crises make borders more solid rather than more permeable, its prospects as a mainstream concept seem bleak. The same is true for the idea of corporate citizenship, which would not be required if corporations were formed and run by sentient citizens who assumed their social responsibilities.

One thing is certain, though, and this paper lies at its heart: thwarting our age of mobility would have important implications in the development and economic growth of the world as, in the words of Yevgeny Kuznetsov: "[b]ecause development depends on learning and learning on searching, development almost invariably depends on linking the domestic economy to the larger, foreign world, for even the strongest economies quickly rediscover (if they have ever forgotten) that they cannot generate all world-beating ideas in isolation"(2009:2).

[14] Keeley quotes Ban, K.M. (2007) We Should Welcome the Dawn of the Migration Age, *The Guardian*, 10 July, Manchester: Guardian News and Media Ltd.

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Sobre el GIGAPP

El Grupo de Investigación en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas (GIGAPP) es una iniciativa académica impulsada por un equipo de doctorandos y profesores del Programa de Gobierno y Administración Pública (GAP) del Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset (IUIOG), Fundación Ortega – Marañón, cuyo principal propósito es contribuir al debate y la generación de nuevos conceptos, enfoques y marcos de análisis en las áreas de gobierno, gestión y políticas públicas, fomentando la creación de espacio de intercambio y colaboración permanente, y facilitando la construcción de redes y proyectos conjuntos sobre la base de actividades de docencia, investigación, asistencia técnica y extensión.

Las áreas de trabajo que constituyen los ejes principales del GIGAPP son:
1. Gobierno, instituciones y comportamiento político
2. Administración Pública
3. Políticas Públicas

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